Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a METAPHYSICS for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the METAPHYSICS of artifacts.

We are glad to learn that Akhondzadeh (1) has brought to the limelight a despairing state of the Iranian scientists being denied access of publication of their valuable scientific research in renowned journals under the unjust and deplorable terminology of sanctions. Such an attitude reflects bias, disparity, and prejudice towards the researchers from the developing world. . . .

MODERN (theoretical) physics seems to be in deep crisis today as many of its core aspects are not empirically well-confirmed. Heated exchanges among physicists on the scientific status of physical theories with little or, at best, a tenuous connection to possible experimental tests is highly visible in the popular scientific literature. Some physicists (e.g., Carroll 2014, 2019; Ijjas et al., 2017) argue that science must discard empirical testability as one of its defining properties and the highly explanatory theories of present-day physics should be exempted from experimental testing, while others (e.g., Ellis & Silk 2014) spot in these arguments (for softening the testability or falsifiability requirement for MODERN physics) a dangerous tendency to undermine science. The philosopher of science who naturally draws most attention in these current debates is Karl Popper (1902-1994). His views, however, are often misrepresented in these debates. The prime objective of this paper is to explain how a more enlightened perspective on the ongoing debates can be obtained by a careful scrutiny of the Popperian criterion of falsifiability. As a first step in achieving this objective we will analyze the two major (conceptual) failures on which the current controversies rest. Our next step will be examining the controversial string theory to see whether the criteria of falsifiability is a ‘blunt instrument’ for determining its scientific status.

The author in this article has an historical review on different views of METAPHYSICS. He believes that looking at the ideas of philosophers from ancient Greece, from middle ages, Muslim and Christian philosophers, and philosophers of the MODERN ages, reveals various aspects of METAPHYSICS. He tries at the end to suggest a general plan to show both the form and the content of all metaphysical systems.

In Kant and the Problem of METAPHYSICS (KPM), Heidegger shows how the initial image-making power of the imagination is pictorial in the pure image of time. He further clarifies the recognized link between the syntheses and the time-visualizing power of images which is pictorial formative power, which can visualize time. The three syntheses of imagination are replaced with the modes of existence of Dasein. Three kinds of photographs resemble the images produced when the transcendental imagination functions as Dasein. We can address the ways to visualize time by considering Dasein with a photographic preoccupation through 1. A possible look in the form of presentation (a photograph shows an immediate look of a house or person as intuitable this-here); 2. An immediate look of the thing, house, or deceased person, as well as a copy or its reproduction as a death mask; and, 3. The manner of contemplation of a likeness is an immediate look of a being present in the form of representation.

In the present article, Kant's view concerning METAPHYSICS has been studied. Having explained lexical and terminological meaning of the term "METAPHYSICS" as understood by Aristotle, the authors have made mentions to various metaphysical systems from Plato to Descartes and his followers. Then, the meaning of the term, as understood in Kant's philosophy, has been studied, and its negative and positive aspects in his philosophy have been discussed. After that, the article comes to the conclusion that, influenced by Hume's ideas, Kant negates METAPHYSICS in its traditional sense (i.e. theoretical and certain knowledge of God, world, and soul). But, he accepts METAPHYSICS in the sense of theoretical support of empirical science, and considers a systematizing role for issues discussed in the traditional METAPHYSICS as well. He leaves confession to objective existence of issues posed in the traditional METAPHYSICS to be discussed in the field of practical reason.

Phenomenology of Spirit is commonly considered Hegel’s debut where he explained, for the first time, his unique dialectical approach. However, it is usually forgotten that the Phenomenology of Spirit is not an independent work, but a result of Jena's philosophizing period (1801-1806) which produced, in addition to a number of other texts, a collection of manuscripts of Jena’s system (Jenaer Systementwürfe). In this collection, Hegel initiates the idea of 'systematic truth' as a 'universal process'. One of the most essential parts of this system is METAPHYSICS, in which Hegel implies a dialectical transition from first grounds of human understanding (principle of contradiction) to the sublime form of truth (absolute spirit). The present paper analyzes three main parts of Jena’s METAPHYSICS – that is, transition from ‘Cognition as a System of First Principles’ to ‘METAPHYSICS of Objectivity’, and finally to ‘METAPHYSICS of Subjectivity’.

Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with METAPHYSICS, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement the main nature of which developed through several stages, the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within each one of its various stages can be easily portrayed. In the meantime, logical realism as the early stage of analytic philosophy contains plenty of metaphysical dispositions. Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate nature of reality and the logical structure of the world. In this paper, then, after giving a relatively complete explanation of the logical realism, we claimed that although logical realists rejected the traditional speculative METAPHYSICS of their predecessors, they also replaced it by the METAPHYSICS of logic that pursues the metaphysical aims, this time, by logical means. So, we portrayed this kind of METAPHYSICS as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism.

Time is one of the most difficult subjects in philosophy. Some philosophers believe that time is a reality and others assume it as an illusion. McTaggart has denied the reality of time. His argument is very famous in the philosophy of time and thus the recent discussions about time are affected by his argument.Events and moments، he thinks، can occur in time in two forms and thus there are two series of time: 1) A series in which two events and moments are ordered as past، present and future, 2) B series in which the events and moments are ordered as a priori and a posterior. The A series is necessary for time because without A series time does not exist. At the same time، A series leads to contradiction and time cannot exist as a real thing. Only one real and non-temporal series، he believes، exists but it appears as time series to us by our perception.

METAPHYSICS is generally a real knowledge which uses demonstration (proof) as its method of discovery; because it is merely argumentation which leads to certainty in its special meaning. Yet some metaphysic schools formed in the field of the transcendental wisdom school of Molla-Sadra do not accept a priori proofs – which is a proof via the nafs-ol-amr cause – because the subject of philosophy is 'being' and the predicates of being are all about being and are identical with it; the reason is that there is nothing other than the reality of being because of the 'principality of being' while being has no cause beyond it. A kind of posteriori proof which is [obtained] through general consequences is considered certain in the "philosophy of realism" and the method of discovery in METAPHYSICS is considered to be this kind of proof. The method of discovery in METAPHYSICS and this innovating view which is rooted in the words of Sheikh-o-Ra'is [Avicenna] is disclosed in this article using an innovative and process analysis.